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TAXABLE ENJOYMENTS UNDER THE CHURCH
AND SPIEGEL DECISIONS
Since 1916 the Federal estate tax has included in the gross estate
of a decedent gifts which he made during his lifetime "intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death."' This phraseology, borrowed from State statutes 2 where it had enjoyed a quiet existence, has become a battleground of incredible carnage both financial
and intellectual. 3 After thirty-three years of controversy over the
meaning of these thirteen words, now found in Section 811(c) of the
Code, the Supreme Court has undertaken to clear away the smoke in
two recent decisions. In Commissioner v. Church4 the Court held that
a decedent who had created a trust in 1924, reserving to himself the income for life, was taxable on the value of the trust corpus at his death
in 1939. The Court squarely overruled May v. Heiner, decided in 1930,
which held that the same statutory words did not tax trusts with reserved life estates. 5 The fall of May v. Heiner did not come as a surprise,6 but whether the uprooting of this landmark was necessary is
another question. Inasmuch as the reserved life estate has been expressly taxable by statute since 1931, the immediate effect of the decision affects only trusts created in the period from 1916 to 1931.
'Revenue Act of 1916, Sec. 202(b), 39 Stat. 777; Revenue Act of 1918, Sec.
402(c), 40 Stat. 1097; Revenue Act of 1921, Sec. 402(c), 42 Stat. 278;
Revenue Act of 1924, Sec. 302(c), 43 Stat. 304; Revenue Act of 1926, Sec.
302(c), 44 Stat. 70, amended by Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, 46 Stat.
1516; Revenue Act of 1932, Sec. 803(a), 47 Stat. 278; Int. Rev. Code, Sec.

811 (c).

2"Origin Of The Phrase, Intended To Take Effect In Possession Or Enjoyment At Or After.... Death (Section 811(c), Int. Rev. Code)," 56 Yale
L. J. 176(1946).
3The decision of May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930) holding the reserved life
estate not taxable threatened a loss to the Treasury in excess of one-third
of the revenue derived from the federal estate tax, with anticipated refunds
in excess of $25,000,000. 74 Cong. Rec. 7198, 7199 (1931). In Spiegel v. Commissioner (U.S. Supreme Court, No. 3, January 17, 1949) the settlor's reversion had a value of $70 at the time of death. The decision included in
his gross estate trust assets valued at $1,140,000 involving approximate taxes
of $450,000. On the intellectual side see Eisenstein, "The Hallock Problem,"
58 Harv. L. Rev. 1141 (1945) ; Alexander, "Possibilities of Reacquisition and
the Federal Estate Tax," 1 Tax L. Rev. 291 (1946); Eisenstein, "Another
Glance at the Hallock Problem," 1 Tax L. Rev. 430 (1946).
4 U.S. Supreme Court, No. 5, january 17, 1949.
5Supra, note 3.
6The Tax Court had premonitions of disaster for the May v. Heiner doctrine
in 1941, Estate of Mary H. Hughes, 44 B.T.A. 1196 (1941), but regained
confidence in Estate of Edward E. Bradley, 1 T.C. 518 (1943), aff'd Helvering
v. Proctor, 140 F.2d 87 (C.C.A. 2d, 1944). As a matter of state law interpretation of the same thirteen words, it was said: ". . . a situation which
is universally held to involve a transfer intended, etc., under state inheritance
tax statutes . . .is the case in which the grantor creates a remainder on a
life estate limited to himself, or transfers property in trust to pay the income
to himself for life with remainders over." Rottschaefer, "Transfers Taking
Effect At Grantor's Death," 26 Iowa L. Rev. 514, 516 (1941).
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Presumably Nichols v. Coolidge7 is still law, and reserved life estate
trusts created before 1916 are within the protection of the due process
clause.
In its second decision, Spiegel v. Commissioner," the Court resolved
nine years of lower court confusion over the meaning and application
of the doctrine in the Hallock case,9 holding that the estate tax applies
to any inter vivos trust transfer where the settlor has a possible reversionary interest, express or by operation of law, however remote and
regardless of his intention to reserve the interest.:' On the facts of the
Spiegel case two dissenting Justices had serious doubts that the trust
limitations to the taxpayer's children created contingent rather than
vested remainders under Illinois law,"x and Mr. Justice Frankfurter
7274
U.S. 531 (1927).
8
Supra, note 3.
9309 U.S. 106 (1940). The doctrine of the Hallock case may be explained in
this way: in May v. Heiner, supra, note 3, the Court held the reserved life
estate trust not taxable because there had been a complete inter vivos disposition of the legal title, that is, the interests of the remaindermen were all
definitely fixed by the trust grant as a matter of title. In Klein v. United
States, 283 U.S. 231 (1931) the decedent had made an inter vivos conveyance
of a common law life estate to his wife, expressly reserving to himself the
reversion, and limiting a remainder interest to his wife only if she survived
him. The Court held the gift includible in the gross estate because there
was an incomplete disposition of legal title, but also indicating as a ground
for its decision the factual contingency in the disposition regardless of the
niceties of the art of conveyancing. In Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296
U.S. 39 (1935) the Court seized on the legal title theory to the exclusion of
the broader aspects of the Klein case, holding the decedent not taxable on an
inter vivos trust grant which gave the remaindermen a vested remainder
subject to being divested if the grantor survived the life tenant. The Court
reasoned that legal title was fixed and completely disposed of in the trust and
in no way affected by the grantor's death. His possibility of reverter merely
became an impossibility. The Hallock case was essentially a reconsideration
and overruling of the St. Louis Trust case. The Court held the express
reverter taxable regardless of whether the remainder interests were vested
subject to being divested or contingent, returning to the broad interpretation
of the Klein decision. The Hallock doctrine precipitated the fall of May v.
Heiner.
10 The problems of the lower courts in applying the Hallock doctrine are discussed and summarized in Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 1946
Supplement, Sec. 7.23. At one time or another the following limitations on
the Hallock doctrine were raised: (1) that the possibility of reverter must
not be too remote; (2) that the reverter must be express and not one arising
by operation of law; (3) that the settlor must have intended to reserve the
interest. All of these limitations have been swept aside by the Spiegel case.
See Corbett, 12 T.C. (No. 22) (1949).
11 The remainder limitations in the Spiegel case were as follows: "Upon my
death, the said Trustees, and the survivor of them, or any successor Trustee,
shall divide said trust fund and any accumulated income thereon then in the
hands of said Trustees, equally among my said three (3) children, and if
any of my said children shall have died, leaving any child or children surviving, then the child or children of such deceased child of mine shall receive the
share of said trust fund to which its or their parent would have been entitled, and if any of my said three (3) children shall have died without leaving any child or children him or her surviving, then the share to which such
deceased child of mine would have been entitled shall go to my remaining
children, and the descendants of any deceased child of mine per stirpes and
not per capita." The Circuit Court of Appeals held that these interests did
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objected that an estate tax liability should hang on such a "gossamer
thread", and a doubtful one at that. Thus, the unwitty diversities of
common law conveyancing have been unleashed on the taxpayer, leav12
ing him to the perils of State law interpretations of future interests.
Lawyers have been advised to consider the "awfulness" of this decision
in its effect on trust dispositions, and one reputable tax authority suggests an ultimate limitation to the United States government in all
trusts. 1 3 The Spiegel doctrine does not justify taxing the decedent, however, merely because he would take from the remaindermen by inheritance. 4
Beyond the present impact of these decisions lies the question of
their ultimate effect on Section 811(c) and related problems. If the
Court means what it said in the Church case, the way is logically open
for an integration of the income, gift and estate taxes along the lines of
retained economic enjoyment that has flourished in the income tax
field. The mandate of the Church decision is that the taxpayer rid himself of "all title, and all possession and all enjoyment." The scope of
taxable enjoyments is apparently beyond the Commissioner's fondest expectations, starting with the "unbreakable cable" of the reserved life
estate in the Church case and extending to the "gossamer thread" of a
lurking reverter in the Spiegel case. The inscrutable Clifford regulations
have never gone so far in their definition of taxable enjoyments for
income tax purposes. " It would also seem that the gift tax must yield,
not vest upon the execution of the trust, and were therefore contingent upon
survival. 159 F.2d 257, 259. Mr. Justice Burton felt that the remainders were
vested, and since Illinois law requires literal compliance with the divesting
conditions before a vested remainder can be divested, the settlor had no
possible interest. Presumably the interest of the last to survive would not
divest upon his death because the conditions for divestment would not be
present
12 The Spiegel decision makes it clear that state law controls. This introduces
an undesirable factor into the administration of a federal tax law, to wit, the
history of alimony trusts. See, "Federal Taxation of Alimony Trusts," 25
Ill. L. Rev. 332 (1940).
' 3 Paul, supra, note 10, p. 194: "In view of the Commissioner's claim that a
remainder to charity is inadequate to exclude the Hallock doctrine, the only
certain escape from tax is to assign any contingent reversionary interest to
the United States. It is safe to assume that Government counsel would not
argue that the grantor or his estate could regain the property because the
Government might collapse or disappear."
14It is safe to assume that the views of Mr. Justice Roberts in Goldstone v.
United States, 325 U.S. 687 (1945) would prevail in this regard. Otherwise,
any gift within the family is taxable at death on the theory that the donee
might predecease the donor and the property pass back to the donor by
intestacy. See Estate of Mabel H. Houghton, 2 T.C. 871, app. dism. C.C.A. 2,
1944.
1sThe Clifford regulations, promulgated by the Commissioner under the decision in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) and found in Reg. 111,
Sec. 29.22(a)-21,-22, cover taxable enjoyments for income tax purposes under
I.R.C. Sec. 22(a). Three broad classifications are made: (1) reversionary
interests, (2) enjoyments affecting disposition, and (3) enjoyments affecting
trust administration.
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abandon its property law concepts of completed transfers and join
the economic approach of retained benefits. Pushed to its logical conclusion, the time is ripe for a thorough-going definition of what can
and what cannot be safely retained by the taxpayer in an inter vivos
gift. Once defined, the taxpayer who has failed to part with taxable
enjoyments has not made a completed transfer and stands liable for
income and estate taxes; more fortunate donors would pay only a gift
tax. 6 The present confusion of the substantial adverse interest test
and of powers outstanding in third parties could also be cleared away
in the integration.
All of this has a Utopian ring, however. There are fundamental
differences between an income tax and a transfer tax; there is a wealth
of case and statutory development that cannot be lightly cast aside;
and furthermore, it is not clear that the Supreme Court means exactly
what it said. It can be safely assumed that the legal title, or property,
interpretation of Section 811(c) has been abandoned in favor of an
enjoyment theory. But the traditional teaching that Section 811(c) is
7
designed to tax "testamentary gifts" has not necessarily left us.'
After all, the thirteen words are found in juxtaposition with the statutory language taxing gifts in contemplation of death. A testamentary
gift, often referred to as a substitute for a will, has a necessary relation to the disposition of property, and it may well be that the enjoyments of which the Court speaks in the Church case are such enjoyments as affect in fact the disposition of the gift property. This explanation would resolve the problem why a taxpayer under the Spiegel
case is liable for estate taxes on a remote possibility of reverter by
operation of law whereas the Clifford regulations would not levy an
income tax for such an enjoyment.' 8 The fact is that the reverter enjoyment affects the disposition of the gift property and for that reason
warrants an estate tax under the theory of a testamentary gift. A similar application to the income tax problem seems unreasonable, although
16 See Warren, "Correlation of Gift and Estate Taxes," 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1,

43 (1941).
17 "It also taxes inter vivos transfers that are too much akin to testamentary
dispositions not to be subjected to the same excise." Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in the Hallock case, supra, note 9, p. 112; the section is designed to "prevent
tax evasion by subjecting to the death tax, forms of gifts inter vivos -which
may be resorted to, as a substitute for a will, in making dispositions of property operative at death." Mr. Justice Stone in the St. Louis Trust case,
supra, note 9, p. 46.
1sThe Clifford regulations, supra, note 15, tax the income of a trust to the
grantor where he has a reversionary interest which will or may be reasonably
expected to take effect in possession or enjoyment within 10 years, or -within
10 to 15 years with certain other enjoyments added. The Regulations provide that the trust income is not attributable to the grantor where the reversionary interest is to take effect in possession or enjoyment at the death of
the person or persons to whom the income is payable. Reg. 111, Sec. 22(a)21 (c) (2).
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not to the gift tax problem on an economic approach. This suggestion
may also explain why the Court failed to mention the Clifford case
in its opinions, leading Mr. Justice Burton to conclude that the case had
been left to its native soil, the income tax."" Also, the Northern Trust
case, 20 where the Court first rejected the argument that an estate tax
could be based on reserved powers over trust administration, still stands
in contradiction to the income tax developments.21 If the Church case
is limited, therefore, to retained enjoyments affecting the disposition of
the transferred property, its sweep may not be unrestricted.
An objection may be raised that under the facts of the Church case
the reserved life estate in no way affected the ultimate disposition of the
property. This is to ignore the fact that the grantor's life was the measuring stick, operating much like a power of termination in the acceleration of remainder interests under the Holmes case. 22 The reserved life

estate is an enjoyment which by its nature affects the "when" of the
enjoyment. It is not believed, however, that the mere fact that remainder interests vest at the grantor's death is sufficient to sustain the tax
without the retained enjoyment. The Northern Trust decision should
remain the law on this point, not because the effect on the remainder
interests is not parallel but because the Church case calls for a retained
enjoyment of some kind. 23
The effect of the Church and Spiegel pronouncements on the Commissioner's Hallock regulations 24 should be interesting. The regulations have required the presence of two elements in the transfer: (1)
possession or enjoyment of the transferred interest can be obtained
19 Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Burton in Spiegel case, discussion of second

proposal.
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929). In this important case
the Court considered, among other problems, the inclusion in the decedent's
gross estate of the corpus of five trusts where he had reserved to himself the
power to supervise the reinvestment of trust funds, to require the trustee to
execute proxies to his nominee, to vote any share of stock held by the
trustee, to control all leases executed by the trustee and to appoint successor
trustees. In rejecting these enjoyments as a ground for taxability, the Court
said: "Nor did the reserved powers of management of the trusts save to
decedent any control over the economic benefits or enjoyment of the property
The shifting of the economic interest in the trust property which was
the subject of the tax was thus complete as soon as the trust was made." p.
346. Even if the Court at this time was primarily concerned with the settlement of legal title, it is still sound on the theory that these enjoyments impose no factual contingency in the disposition, which is essential to a testamentary gift.
21Under
the Clifford regulations, supra, note 15, an administrative control
exercisable primarily for the benefit of the grantor, such as powers to vote
the stock, or control investments, etc., will support the income tax. Reg. 111,
Sec. 22(a)-21 (e) (4).
22 Commissioner v. Estate of Harry Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946).
23
Also, how can a living settlor shed the estate tax liability by giving away the
reserved life estate if the remainder interests will vest according to the
original trust grant? The problem is discussed in Rottschaefer, "Transfers
2 4 Taking Effect at Grantor's Death," 26 Iowa L. Rev. 514, 526.
Reg. 105, Sec. 81.17.
20
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only by beneficiaries who must survive the decedent, and (2) the decedent or his estate must possess some right or interest in the property
(whether arising by the express terms of the instrument of transfer or
otherwise). Inasmuch as the Commissioner himself has not been
scrupulous in the observance of the first requirement2 5 its elimination
as an essential test should not come as a shock. Although on the facts
of both the Church and Spiegel cases the remaindermen had to survive
the grantor to enjoy,26 the Court's approach does not give this factor
significance in the latter decision and in the former it merely serves
to make the retained enjoyment testamentary in effect. The second requirement, without the qualification that the right or interest must
inject a factual contingency into the disposition, seems incomplete unless the retained enjoyment is sufficient in itself. It is suggested that
the regulations might be modified to provide one test, namely, whether
the retained enjoyment or possibility of enjoyment affects in fact the
disposition of the enjoyment. This would account for the distinction
between the income tax field where the test is whether the benefit justifies the burden of the tax,2 7 and the estate tax field where the test has
been the testamentary effect of the transfer. There is the likelihood,
however, that the entire emphasis in the income-gift-estate problem
may be shifted to a question of ownership for tax purposes and what
constitutes the transfer of that ownership.
WARNER

H. HENRICKSON*

See Eisenstein, "The Hallock Problem," 58 Harv. L. Rev. 1141, 1146, (1945).
In a trust grant to B for life, C for life, remainder to C's surviving issue,
the Commissioner has insisted on taxability because of the reversionary interest in spite of the fact that C's issue do not have to survive the grantor
to take. See Frances Biddle Trust, 3 T.C. 832, app. dism. C.C.A. 3, 1945.
26 The Church case was a reserved life estate; the Spiegel case was income to
children for the life of the grantor and then remainders.
27The due process limitation which underlies the income tax developments was
expressed by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933)
at p. 678: "Liability may rest upon the enjoyment by the taxpayer of privileges
and benefits so substantial and important as to make it reasonable and just to
deal with him as if he were the owner and to tax him on that basis. A margin
must be allowed for the play of legislative judgment. To overcome this
statute the taxpayer must show that in attributing to him the ownership of
the income of the trusts, or something fairly to be dealt with as equivalent
to ownership, that the lawmakers have done a wholly arbitrary thing, have
found equivalence where there was none nor anything approaching it, and
laid a burden unrelated to privilege or benefit.'
*Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
25

